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ABSTRACT 
 
ESSAYS ON APPLIED MACROECONOMICS 
İnce, Onur 
 
Master of Economics 
Supervisor: Asst. Prof. Ümit Özlale 
 
July, 2005 
 
This study contains three studies, the relationship between FED intervention 
and emerging markets, the effect of S&P500 return on Istanbul Stock Exchange and 
the connection between Turkish industrial production growth and the success of 
Beşiktaş. The second chapter analyzes the effect of FED intervention on emerging 
markets with using event-study analysis. Considering Emerging Market Bond Index 
(EMBI) and grouping the effect under five different categories, the effect of FED 
intervention on emerging markets are shown. The third chapter assesses the effect of 
S&P500 return on the Istanbul Stock Exchange within a dynamic framework. In 
order to capture the effect, we build a block recursive VAR model allowing that 
S&P500 affects the ISE returns with its current and lag values but not vice versa. The 
estimates from daily data suggest that returns on S&P500 affect ISE return positively 
up to 4 days. The fourth chapter investigates the connection between Turkish 
industrial production growth and the success of Beşiktaş, which is a popular Turkish 
soccer team. The empirical evidence provided in the paper suggests that industrial 
production growth tends to increase with the success of Beşiktaş in European cups. 
Moreover, if the winnings are in displacement, the increase in industrial production 
 iii
is higher than if the winnings are in the home field. On the other hand, findings on 
the effects of domestic games on industrial performance are not statistically 
significant. 
 
 
 
Keywords: Block Recursive VAR, EMBI, Emerging Markets, Event Study Analysis, 
Industrial Production, Sports Economics                                                      
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ÖZET 
 
UYGULAMALI MAKROEKONOMİ HAKKINDA ÇALIŞMALAR 
İnce, Onur 
Yüksek Lisans, İktisat Bölümü 
Tez Danışmanı: Yrd. Doç. Dr. Ümit Özlale 
 Temmuz, 2005 
 
   
Bu çalışma, FED müdahalesi ve gelişmekte olan ülkeler arasındaki ilişkiyi, S&P500 
getirisinin İstanbul Menkul Kıymetler Borsası’na etkisini ve Türkiye’deki 
endüstriyel üretim büyümesi ile Beşiktaş arasındaki bağlantıyı inceleyen üç 
çalışmadan oluşmaktadır. İkinci bölümde olay inceleme analizi kullanılarak FED 
müdahalesinin gelişmekte olan ülkelere etkisi incelenmektedir. Gelişmekte olan 
piyasalar endeksi (EMBI) göz önünde bulundurularak FED müdahalesi beş kategori 
altında gösterilmiştir. Üçüncü bölümde S&P500 getirisinin İstanbul Menkul 
Kıymetler Borsası’na etkisini aktif çatı altında   incelenmektedir. Etkiyi yakalamak 
için blok özyineli VAR modeli kullanılmış, böylelikle S&P500 endeksinin cari ve 
önceki değerlerinin İMKB getirisine etkisi incelenmiş ve İMKB getirisinin S&P500 
endeksine etkisi engellenmiştir. Günlük veri kullanılarak S&P500’e gelen pozitif bir 
şokun İMKB getirisini pozitif olarak 4 güne kadar etkilediği görülmüştür.  Son 
bölümde Türkiye’deki endüstriyel üretim büyümesi ile popüler futbol Türk takımı 
Beşiktaş arasındaki bağlantı irdelenmiştir. Ampirik gözlem yapılarak Beşiktaş’ın 
Avrupa Kupalarındaki başarısının endüstriyel üretim büyümesini arttırdığı 
 v
görülmüştür. Bununla beraber  deplasmanda kazanılan maç, evde kazanılan maça 
göre endüstriyel üretimi daha çok arttırmaktadır. Öte yandan Türkiye liginde 
oynanan maçların endüstriyel üretime etkisi istatiksel bir kesinlik içermemektedir.   
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Blok Özyineli VAR, EMBI, Endüstriyel Üretim, Gelişmekte 
Olan Piyasalar, Olay İnceleme Analizi, Spor Ekonomisi 
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
This study is comprised of three chapters. In chapter 2, an event-study is used 
to throw light on the missing link between Federal Reserve actions and emerging 
markets. The effect of S&P500’s return on Istanbul stock exchange is examined in 
Chapter 3. Finally in the last chapter, the relationship between industrial production 
growth and the wins of the Turkish soccer team Beşiktaş in European cups is 
explained.   
The financial markets of countries that are not full industrialized are 
somehow very sensitive to the performance of industrialized economies. Within the 
fast globalization process, as financial markets grow closer, the policymakers of 
highly industrialized countries can surely affect emerging market economies. The 
Federal Reserve, the authority that executes the monetary policy of the US, generally 
balances the US financial markets using interest rates, the main policy tool of 
monetary policy. However the change in US financial markets in order to adopt the 
new policies executed by the FED, automatically affects emerging market economies 
that are closely connected to US financial markets. Accordingly, it is possible to 
reveal the link between emerging markets and Federal Reserve actions. Using the 
Emerging Market Bond Index (EMBI), which exhibits the risk premium of emerging 
market economies, the relationship between FED actions and the EMBI of 12 
emerging markets are examined using event-study methodology in chapter 2. 
In the light of the relationship between highly industrialized economies and 
emerging market economies, the correlation for the asset market side can be explored 
by analyzing the relationship between the US asset market and the asset market of an 
emerging economy, Turkey. S&P500 can be employed to select a proxy measure for 
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the US asset market. A market value weighted index, with each stock's weight in the 
index proportionate to its market value, the S&P500 is one of the most commonly 
used benchmarks of the overall stock market in the US. While the S&P500 is 
employed as a proxy measure for the US market, the ISE100 index is used as a proxy 
measure for the Turkish asset market. The ISE100, calculated since the inception of 
the Istanbul Stock Exchange, is composed of all National Market companies except 
investment trusts. The constituents of the ISE100 Index are selected on the basis of 
pre-determined criteria. The ISE100 index also contains the companies in the ISE30 
index and the ISE50 index. In order to reflect the relationship between a large 
country and a small country, block recursive VAR is used. Block recursive VAR 
model provides a barrier to eliminate the effect of the performance of a small country 
on a large country. Although the performance of the US stock exchange is 
determined by its own dynamics, its own lag and foreign stock exchange movements 
affect the performance of the Turkish stock market. By estimating the impulse 
response functions for 20 days regarding how the ISE100 returns responded to a one-
standard deviation shock to S&P500, it is found that the returns on the S&P500 
affect the ISE100 return positively up to four days. 
In the last chapter, the connection between sport activities and economic 
performance is addressed to illustrate the importance of soccer in determining 
Turkish people’s psychological well-being and the happy-worker hypothesis, the 
effect of the success of Beşiktaş, one of the top ranked soccer teams in Turkey, on 
Turkish industrial performance is examined. It is assumed that the success of a 
popular team in Turkey may be able to motivate workers positively and increase their 
economic performance. Using a transfer function analysis, a game being won by 
Beşiktaş in European cup competitions can cause an increase in the monthly rate of 
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industrial growth. The increase is higher if the winning game in Europe is played in 
the opponent’s field. However, for the games won by Beşiktaş in Turkey, a 
significant relationship does not exist. 
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CHAPTER 2 
The Effect of FED Intervention on Emerging Markets 
 
2.1 LITERATURE SURVEY 
It has been well documented that the financial markets react strongly to the 
policy changes of the FED. In, 2004, the FED increased the future fund rates 5 times 
(out of 8 meetings) with a value of 0.25.  As a matter of fact, all these 
announcements had different effects on markets. In this respect, the responses of the 
markets to surprise changes in federal funds rates receive considerable interest.  
Figure 1 illustrates how markets anticipate the federal funds rates change. 
Kuttner (2001) identified the actual and surprise components of FED 
announcements on markets. He stated that if the announcement made by the FED at 
time t was expected, then the spot rate would remain unchanged. Any deviation from 
the expected rate would result in a change in the futures rate, by an amount 
proportionate to the number of days affected by the change. There is a considerable 
literature that investigates the policy changes of the Federal Reserve. Cook and Hahn 
(1989) observed the one-day response of bond rates to changes in the target federal 
fund rates from 1974-1979 and found that the response to target rate increases was 
positive and significant at all maturities. However, they did not deal with the surprise 
component of federal funds rates. The gap was fulfilled by Kuttner (2001) and 
Bernanke and Kutner (2003). Kuttner (2001) found that interest rates’ response to 
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anticipated target changes is small, while their response to unanticipated target 
changes is great. Bernanke and Kuttner (2003) extended this argument to stock 
prices. They examined the impact of unanticipated changes in federal funds rates 
target on equity prices and found that an unanticipated 25 basis point cut caused a 1 
percent increase in the level of stock prices between 1989-2002. The effects of 
federal funds rates on stock prices were also examined by Rigobon and Sack (2002) 
and they reached the conclusion that an increase in short-term interest rates results in 
a decline in stock prices. Recently Gurkaynak, Sack and Swanson (2005) indicated 
that instead of the current federal fund rate decision of the FOMC, the statements that 
it releases had substantial effects on asset prices between 1980 and 2004. 
Despite the vast literature of FED policy surprises on US asset prices, the 
literature falls short of extending these policy surprises to emerging market cases. As 
financial markets become more and more interconnected, these policy surprises can 
surely have effects on emerging market economies as well.  
This paper attempts to close this gap by analyzing the effect of the change in 
federal funds rates on 12 emerging market economies between 31.12.1997 through 
20.07.2004. This is done by looking at responses of the EMBI spread to changes in 
both the actual and the surprise component of the federal funds rates. The EMBI has 
several important features as discussed in Aktas, Kaya and Ozlale (2005). First, it is a 
primary source in many empirical studies for measuring the risk premium. It is a unit 
of measure of pure sovereign default risk and assembled as excess promised returns 
on the United States treasuries. The EMBI spread not only demonstrates domestic 
fundamentals but also points out external factors and political news.   
Finally an event-study methodology is employed to conduct the analysis. 
Event-study has two advantages. First, it does not require the imposition of a 
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structural model as illustrated in MacKinlay (1997). This constitutes an advantage 
for a cross-country study, where each country has different dynamics and 
macroeconomic structures. Second, there are not enough observations. Very rare 
policy changes can be observed but there exists a dense date. As discussed in Fatum 
and Hutchison (1999), time series analysis cannot capture the relationship when the 
variable of interest (federal funds rates in this case) has changed only a limited 
number of times. 
Finally we perform the rank test of Cragg and Donald (1997) to point out the 
number of factors that affect the change in the EMBI spread. The countries are 
divided into two subgroups in order to exhibit the change in the factors that affect the 
EMBI spread across countries. Using the rank test, we are also able to identify a 
number of other factors that affect the EMBI spread other than change in the surprise 
component of federal funds rates.   
The outline of this paper as follows: The second section discusses how FED 
policy changes affect the EMBI spread in emerging markets. The results are 
presented in section three, while section four concludes the study.  
 
2.2 THE MODEL 
There are 12 countries in the sample used for this study: Brazil, Bulgaria, 
Egypt, Mexico, Nigeria, Panama, Peru, Poland, Russia, South Africa, Turkey and 
Venezuela. It has been anticipated the change in the EMBI of these 12 countries will 
depend on both the expected and unexpected (surprise) changes in federals funds 
rates.   
There are 5 broad categories in the event window. If the actual and surprise 
changes in federal funds rates are positive; that is, if the FED implements a tighter 
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monetary policy than expected, an increase in the EMBI can be expected. However, 
if the FED carries out a more expansionary monetary policy than expected, which 
causes a negative change in the actual and surprise components; a decrease in the 
EMBI is expected.  
When the actual and surprise components of federal funds rates have opposite 
signs, the effect of the surprise change dominates the effect of the actual change. A 
decrease in the EMBI is expected at the time the actual change in the federal funds 
rates is positive and the surprise change in the federal funds rate is negative because 
FED executes a tight but less tight monetary policy by announcing interest rates 
lower than expected. Nevertheless, in the case of the actual change is negative and 
the surprise change is positive, which means imposing an expansionary but less 
expansionary monetary policy than expected, an increase in the EMBI can be 
estimated.  
Finally if the change in federal funds rates is fully expected (in other words 
the surprise component is zero) the EMBI increases if the actual change is positive 
and decreases if the actual change is negative.  
Examining the effect of a change in federal funds rates on emerging markets, 
involves considering not only how the change affects the EMBI but also how the 
change affects exchange rate parities. An alteration in risk premiums will probably 
affect the demand on exchange rates by influencing both internal and external market 
agents.  
Considering the exchange rate regimes in emerging markets, countries that 
impose fixed exchange rate regimes, may change the parity ratios in order to sustain 
the market balance. It is necessary to determine whether an intervention appears in 
the exchange rate ratio, before and after the event time when the FED announced a 
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change in the federal funds rates. However, considering the countries imposing 
floating exchange rate regimes, we try to analyze whether changes in exchange rate 
parities are significantly affected or not. A depreciation in the domestic exchange 
rate is expected for two cases. Firstly, when the change in the actual and surprise 
components is positive and secondly at the time when the actual change is negative 
while the surprise change is positive. These two cases are also the cases that 
anticipate an increase in the EMBI. However, an appreciation in the domestic 
exchange rate is expected when the change in the actual and surprise components are 
both negative and when the actual change is positive while the surprise change is 
negative. While estimating a decrease in the EMBI, at the same time we expect an 
appreciation in the domestic exchange rate. In the situation where the change in the 
surprise component is zero, we expect an appreciation in the domestic exchange rate 
when the actual change is negative and depreciation is expected when the actual 
change is positive.      
We employ an event study analysis in order to specify the effect of a change 
in federal funds rates on the EMBI and exchange rates. To clarify the effect, we use 5 
and 10-day event windows, which help to show whether the intervention made on the 
event day has a significant effect on the EMBI and exchange rates. We use mean and 
variance tests to demonstrate whether the intervention has significant and expected 
effects on the EMBI and exchange rates. A 5-day analysis is used to express the 
short-term effect of the intervention made by the FED on federal funds rates The 
purpose of a 10-day analysis is to indicate the long-term effectiveness of the 
intervention by considering whether the change is significant or expected for the 
EMBI and for the exchange rate parity. 
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In order to investigate the effectiveness of the FED announcements on 
emerging markets, the rank test of Cragg and Donald (1997) is used. A further 
question that can be asked with the help of the rank test is how many factors 
determine the change in the EMBI spread in these emerging markets. The X matrix, 
Txn matrix, whose rows denote the FED intervention dates and columns denote the 
EMBI spread can be used to clarify this question. Each element in the matrix X 
represents the 5-day mean change in the EMBI spread before and after the 
intervention dates. X takes the form of1 
X = ҒΛ+ η      (1) 
Ғ is a Txk matrix, which includes the unobserved factors with (k<n). Λ is a kxn 
matrix that represents the factor loadings. Finally, η is a Txn matrix, which defines 
the white noise disturbances. In order to test the effect of FED intervention on the 
EMBI spread, using the Tx1 vector Ғ and constants λi, i=1,…..,k , we set the 
hypothesis whether the vector Ғx [λ1,……, λk]  describes the vector X up to white 
noise. Using the rank test of Cragg and Donald (1997), measuring the minimum 
distance between Cov (X) and the covariance matrices of all possible factor models 
with k0, and limiting χ2 distribution with (n – k0)(n – k0 + 1) / 2-n degrees of freedom, 
satisfies us to test X to be described k0 factors against the alternative X is described 
by k>k0 factors.  
The result of the rank test is reported in Table 1. The emerging markets are 
divided into 2 subgroups. The first group consists of 7 countries: Venezuela, Mexico, 
Panama, Poland, Russia, Turkey and South Africa. We strongly reject the hypothesis 
that change in the EMBI spread is characterized by none or by one factor. The result 
gives another implication that the change in the EMBI spread is affected not only by 
                                                 
1 The linear model is fully taken from Gurkaynak,Sack and Swanson (2005) 
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FED intervention. There is another factor that affects the change in the EMBI spread 
in these emerging market economies. According to our model we assume the second 
effect in unobserved factors.  
The second group of countries consists of Brazil, Bulgaria, Egypt, Nigeria 
and Peru contrary to the first group, we strongly reject that no common factor that 
affects the EMBI spread in these emerging market economies. We again also assume 
that the one common factor is FED intervention. However, it can also be seen in the 
results section that the relationship between the FED announcements and the change 
in the EMBI spread of countries in the second group is weak. 
 
2.3 RESULTS 
There are 5 categories as discussed above. The results are presented in Tables 
2-6. In each table we summarized the number of events that occurred in the sample 
period for each category. The dates of the interventions and the changes in the actual 
and surprise components of federal funds rates are also reported. We also submit the 
number of Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) meetings on the event days. 
We separate the results in 2 cases, expected and unexpected; that is, whether the 
actual change in the EMBI spread is analogous with the theory or not. If the change 
in EMBI for an emerging country is analogous with the theory, then we assemble the 
countries under the “Expected” column. If the change in the EMBI spread for an 
emerging country is contrary to the theory, we accumulate the countries in the 
”Unexpected” column. EMBI in the countries can have expected (unexpected) sign 
in 5-day window and unexpected (expected) sign in 10-day event window. At that 
time, a country’s being in the “Unexpected” column will demonstrate the 
ineffectiveness of the intervention for either short-term or long-term or both. If the 
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name of the country is in the “Unexpected” column for 5-day event window, then the 
intervention is not successful in the short-run.  If the country appears in the 
“Unexpected” column for 10-day event window and in the “Expected” column for 5-
day event window, then the intervention is successful in the short-run but 
unsuccessful in the long run.      
We have 3 events for the first category, where the changes in the actual and 
surprise components are positive and the FED imposes tighter monetary policy than 
expected by financial markets. The results are reported in Table 2. For event 1, 
24.08.1999, the change in the EMBI of Egypt, Poland and South Africa; for event 2, 
16.11.1999, the change in the EMBI of Brazil and Egypt; for event 3, 16.05.2000, the 
change in the EMBI of Brazil, Venezuela, Peru, Poland, Russia and Turkey are 
significantly increased both in the 5-day and the 10-day event windows. However in 
event 3, the changes in the EMBI of all countries except Egypt in 10-day event 
window, are in the expected direction.  
In category 2, where the change in the actual component of federal funds 
rates is positive but the change in the surprise component is negative, at the time 
when the FED applies tight but less tight monetary policy than the financial markets 
expect. There are 4 events to examine. The results are reported in Table 3. 
Venezuela, Mexico, Poland and Turkey on 30.06.1999 for event 1; Brazil, Nigeria, 
Peru and Turkey on 02.02.2000 for event 2; Turkey on 21.03.2000 for event 3 and 
Bulgaria, Venezuela and Nigeria on 30.06.2004 for event 4 have significantly 
decreasing EMBI for the 5-day and the 10-day event windows. 
Examining the effects of change in federal funds rates on the emerging 
markets, in category 3 where both actual and surprise changes in federal funds rates 
are negative; the FED enforces a more expansionary monetary policy than expected. 
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There are 9 events to observe and the interesting results obtained in this case are 
reported in Table 4. For event 1, on 15.10.1998, the EMBI in all the emerging 
markets, as expected, decreased significantly in both the 5-day and the 10-day event 
windows. Eventually, the intervention on 15.10.1998 is successful in both short and 
long-term. In event 1 on 15.10.1998, financial markets expect a tight monetary 
policy, since expected change is positive; however, the FED surprisingly imposes an 
expansionary policy so the change in the surprise component of federal funds rates is 
very high. Nevertheless, in the second event on 17.11.1998, the EMBI of all the 
emerging markets are in the expected direction in the 5-day window and the results 
are all statistically significant. The intervention on 17.11.1998 is successful in the 
short-term for all the emerging markets in the sample. Eventually the intervention is 
ineffective in Egypt, which has an increasing EMBI in the 10-day event window.  In 
the third event on 03.01.2001, the EMBI decreased in all of the countries both in the 
5- day (except Nigeria) and in the 10-day event window. This EMBI decrease is 
statistically significant in all the emerging markets for 10-day event window (except 
for Nigeria). In the fifth event on 15.05.2001, all the countries have decreasing EMBI 
for the 5-day window and the 10-day window (except for Bulgaria, which had 
unsuccessful intervention in the long-term), which is statistically significant and 
expected. In event 6 on 17.09.2001, the EMBI predictably increased in all the 
countries significantly for the 10-day event window although the FED imposed a 
very expansionary policy, which was much higher than expected. Since 17.09.2001 
was just a few days after the September 11 tragedy, not only the emerging markets 
but all the markets in the world had an increasing risk premium resulting in a 
significant EMBI increase in all the markets. Panama and Russia in event 4 on 
18.04.2001, all the countries except for Brazil, Mexico and Egypt in event 8 on 
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06.11.2001, Mexico and Poland in event 9 on 06.11.2002 had significantly 
decreasing EMBI in both the 5-day and the 10-day event windows. 
In category 4, while the actual component of federal funds rates decreased, 
the surprise component increased because the FED applied a less expansionary 
monetary policy than expected. An increase in EMBI for the countries in the sample 
was expected. Interpreting the results presented in Table 5, Nigeria and Panama for 
the intervention on 31.01.2001; Brazil, Bulgaria, Egypt, Nigeria and Turkey for the 
intervention on 20.03.2001; Brazil, Venezuela and Egypt for the intervention on 
27.06.2001; Mexico, Panama and Russia for the intervention on 21.08.2001 and 
finally Brazil, Bulgaria, Venezuela, Poland and South Africa for the intervention on 
25.06.2003 had significantly increasing EMBI for both the 5-day and the 10-day 
event windows. 
Finally in the category 5, the intervention is fully expected, so the change in 
the surprise component is zero in Table 6. The single event on 11.12.2001, which is 
the actual decrease in federal funds rates, which is -0.25, all the countries except 
Peru, Brazil and Egypt, has significantly decreasing EMBI both in the 5-day and the 
10-day event windows as expected.     
It is also necessary to pay attention to how the FED announcements affect the 
exchange rate of the countries in the sample. Venezuela has a fixed exchange rate 
regime for some periods in the time period examined. It is essential to determine 
whether these countries had changed their fixed exchange rate parities after the 
announcements or not. However, we are unable to find any change in the parity in 
these countries. For the countries that have floating exchange regimes, we expect an 
appreciation in the exchange rate when the actual and surprise components of the 
federal funds rates are negative, and depreciation when the actual and surprise 
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components are positive. However, the trend of the exchange rates does not justify 
the theory so it was not possible to find a significant relationship between the FED 
announcements and exchange rate trends.    
 
2.4 CONCLUSION 
This study analyzes the relationship between the change in the federal funds 
rates and the EMBI spread in the emerging markets of the sample. The rank test of 
Cragg and Donald (1997) is employed. The countries are divided into 2 subgroups 
and we strongly reject that there is no or only one common factor that affects the 
EMBI spread in the countries in the first group. However, we strongly reject the 
hypothesis that no common factor affects the EMBI spread in the second group of 
countries.  
There are 5 broad cases, concerning how the changes in the actual and 
surprise components of federal funds rates affect the EMBI spread of the emerging 
markets. There are strong results especially in the third category, where both the 
actual and surprise components are negative. On 15.10.1998, the EMBI in all the 
countries, as expected, decreased significantly in both the 5 and 10-day event 
windows. Nonetheless, the EMBI of the countries (excluding Egypt on 17.11.1998 
and Bulgaria on 03.01.2001) decreased in all of the countries in both the 5-day and 
the 10-day event windows. The relationship between the exchange rate of the 
emerging markets and the change in federal funds rates is also examined. However, a 
significant correlation between the exchange rate and the federal funds rates was not 
discovered in the countries that have both the fixed exchange rate regime and 
floating exchange rate regime.     
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CHAPTER 3 
Effect Of S&P500’S Return On Emerging Markets: Turkish 
Experience 
 
3.1 Literature Survey 
World economies and financial markets are becoming increasingly 
interconnected in today’s world. The globalization process helps to speed up this 
interconnection. Therefore, analysis of this interrelation becomes important for both 
portfolio managers and academics in the global era. In order to see the importance of 
interconnection in financial markets, we examined the relationship between the US 
stock market and the Turkish stock market using daily data for the period from 1987 
to 2004. We used the S&P500 index and the ISE100 index for the US and Turkish 
stock markets, respectively. Our model incorporates the assumption that returns on 
S&P500 affect the return on ISE100 but not vice versa. In order to incorporate and 
capture the dynamic relationship among prospective returns, we used a block 
recursive VAR as in Zha (1999). We found that an innovation in the S&P500 return 
increases the ISE100 return for up to 4 days in a statistically significant fashion. 
Research on the interaction between global stock markets and US stock 
markets provides various results. Eun and Shim (1989) found that US equity markets 
affect world markets. They argued that the US is the most dominant market in the 
world. Tokic (2003) found a long run relationship between the US and five markets; 
Australia, Japan, Hong Kong, New Zealand and Singapore. According to Cheung 
and Mak (1992), Liu and Pan (1997), Wu and Su (1998), both US and Japanese stock 
 15
markets affect Asian countries. Cha and Oh (2000) reported that Japanese and US 
markets affect Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore and Taiwan. Gilmore and Mcmannus 
(2002) found a correlation between the US and three central European markets: the 
Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. Kasa (1992) and Arshanapalli and Doukas 
(1993) found bivariate co-integration of European Markets and the US. Seweel 
(1996) provided varying degrees of integration between Pacific Rim equity markets 
and the US. Ghosh (1999) found that the US shares a long run equilibrium 
relationship with Hong Kong, India, Korea and Malaysia. Some studies also 
elaborate on the time-varying nature of the US and other stock markets. Eun and 
Shim (1989) and Arshanapalli and Doukas (1993) reported that US and global 
financial markets have stronger correlation, especially after the October 1987 
collapse in US financial markets. Although relationships between the US and other 
stock markets were found in the research mentioned above, some studies are opposed 
to the idea of interaction between stock markets. Ghosh (1999) could not find any 
effect of the US and Japan on the stock markets of Taiwan and Thailand. Byers and 
Peel (1993) and Kanas (1998) found no linkage between US and European markets, 
constituted by both developed and emerging markets. Felix (1998) found no long run 
co-movement between the US and a number of emerging markets.  
The research cited above examines relationships between stock markets, 
including those of emerging markets, using two alternative approaches: Co-
integration tests and Vector Autoregressive (VAR) models. Co-integration tests 
capture any long run relationships among the stock markets but these tests do not 
allow for short-term interaction. However, the VAR technique allows dynamic 
interactions among markets In this paper, we use the VAR model in order to assess 
short-term correlations and capture dynamic interaction.  
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While correlation between US stock markets and a number of emerging 
markets had not been found in many studies, assessing any correlation between US 
stock markets and stock market of Turkey is a worthwhile exercise. Turkey is 
distinct from other liberalized emerging markets in important aspects. Turkey has 
been liberalizing her economy since the early 1980s. Although never experiencing 
hyperinflation, as some Latin American economies, Turkey has had persistent 
inflation at considerably high and varying levels for about three decades because of 
the unstable political and social environment. The importance of the stock market in 
the overall economic activity grows, as indicated by the rise in stock market 
capitalization from 12.6 percent of the GDP in 1990 to 34.8 percent in 2000. These 
features distinguish the Turkish stock market from the emerging markets that 
constitute the foundation of the research mentioned above. 
The outline of this paper is as follows; the second section elaborates on the 
methodology and provides the empirical evidence. Finally, the paper is concluded in 
the last section. 
 
3.2 Methodology 
A model, similar to the structural vector autoregressive (SVAR) model 
proposed by Cushman and Zha (1997), is used to examine the effect of a large 
economy’s stock exchange movement on a small economy’s stock exchange 
movement. The foreign stock exchange index follows its own dynamics (an AR 
process is used as a proxy).  Turkish stock exchange movements are affected by its 
own lag and movements of the foreign stock exchange. Therefore, the foreign stock 
exchange can be thought to have an exogenous affect on the Turkish stock exchange. 
None of the lag variables of the Turkish stock exchange determine foreign stock 
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exchange; however, lag values and spot values of the foreign stock exchange affect 
Turkish stock exchange movement.  
The VAR model has some advantages relative to the single equation model 
since the VAR model allows dynamic interactions among variables and the VAR 
model has predictive power compared to the single equation model. We also use 
VAR with block exogeneity since in conventional VAR; stock exchange movements 
of foreign markets are affected by domestic stock exchanges including lag values. By 
block exogeneity, we overcome this problem. 
The general specification of the identified VAR model of Cushman and Zha 
(1997) is; 
)()()( ttyLA ε=                                                                                                (2) 
in which, the A(L) is an mxm matrix polynomial in the lag operator L, y(t) is the mx1 
observations vector, and ε(t) is the mx1 vector of structural disturbances. Equation 3 
shows the specification of the model. 
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In Equation 3, we assume that )(tε  is uncorrelated with )( jty −  for  and A(0) 0>j  
                                                
is non-singular. Block exogeneity is represented by  in the matrix, which is 
zero. This means that y
)(L12A
1(t)is exogenous to the second block both simultaneously and 
also for lagged values. To calculate the standard errors of the impulse response 
functions, we used the modified error bands of Bernanke, Hall, Leeper, Sims and Zha 
(1996) for the maximum likelihood estimation (MLE)2 
 
2 See Sims (1986) and Gordon and Leeper (1994). 
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 The observation matrices are such that y1= [Foreign Stock Exchange], y2= 
[Domestic Stock Exchange] and the lag order of the identified VAR model is 5 as 
suggested by Bayesian information criteria. All error bands in this paper were 
generated with 5000 Monto Carlo draws.  
The period, starting from the establishment of the Istanbul Stock Exchange 
on 23.10.1987 to 08.06.2004, has many interruptions, so various sub periods have 
been considered for the analysis. The major break periods were the financial crisis in 
April 1994; the beginning of the disinflation program in December 1999; the 
financial crises in November 2000 and in February 2001; the September 11 2001 
terrorist attack on the twin towers in the US, which also affected the ISE; the 
memorandum crisis in the Turkish Parliament, when logistic support for the USA in 
war with Iraq was refused in February 2003.  
The corresponding impulse responses are reported in the figures. Figure 2 
reports the impulse response functions for 20 days regarding how the ISE100 returns 
responded to a one-standard deviation shock to S&P500 returns by considering the 
full sample period. The middle line is for impulse responses and the other two lines 
are for the confidence bonds at 90% level of confidence bonds. It is important to 
recognize that a shock to the S&P500 does not affect the ISE100 return 
contemporaneously. The main reason for this is that when the NYSE closes, it is the 
beginning of the next day in the ISE (the time difference between Istanbul and New 
York being 7 hours). However, a positive shock on the S&P500 index causes a 
change on the ISE100 for 6 days and also causes an increase in the ISE100 index for 
2.5 days in a statistically significant manner.  
Figures 3 to 8 report the impulse responses for different sub samples. Except 
for the period between 01.01.2002 to 28.02.2003, a statistically significant effect of 
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the S&P500 returns on the ISE100 returns is observed. It is not surprising that the 
adaptation of the new government and their struggle with the memorandum to give 
logistic support to the USA for the war in Iraq caused uncertainty in the Turkish 
market, so the effect of the S&P500 on the ISE100 was not observed in that period. 
In general, for all sub-samples, except for Figure 7, a one standard deviation shock to 
the S&P500 caused an increase in the ISE100 returns in a significant manner. 
However, the effect of the shock continued for 16 days at most as shown in Figure 6. 
 
3.3 Conclusion 
Interactions among stock markets, increasing with globalization process, 
encourage economists to assess whether any relationships exist. In this paper, we 
examine the effect of US stock exchange performance on the Turkish stock 
exchange. We use the S&P500 index for the US stock exchange and the ISE100 
index for the Turkish stock exchange. We assume that US stock exchange 
performance is not affected by Turkish stock market; however, the Turkish stock 
exchange is affected by both its own dynamics and the US stock exchange. We 
reflect this assumption in our specification by using the Block recursive VAR model. 
Our sample includes the daily observations from 23.10.1987 to 08.06.2004 
and we found that a positive shock to the US stock exchange increases the Turkish 
stock exchange in a statistically significant manner. The sample period is a long 
period for both US and Turkish markets, so we divided the period into 6 sub-
samples. We again found a statistically significant relationship between US and 
Turkish stock exchanges in our sub- samples except for the period 01.01.2002 to 
28.02.2003, which corresponds to the process of adaptation of new Turkish 
government and memorandum proposal, which ended in the refusal of logistic 
support to United States in the war with Iraq.                                           
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CHAPTER 4 
Success In Soccer And Economic Performance: Evidence From 
Beşiktaş-Turkey 
 
4.1 Literature Survey 
There has been considerable discussion in the literature about the connection 
between sports activities and economic performance. Even casual observations may 
reveal the fact that a considerable volume of economic activity is attached to 
professional sports. In almost every country, there are national leagues of several 
branches of professional games, which induce the movement of massive amounts of 
financial assets, possessed by either the private or the public sector. Furthermore, 
international contests, cups, and Olympic games help to extend these movements 
beyond national borders. Therefore, one is always curious about the possible effects 
of professional sports on the economy. Another important aspect of professional 
sports is probably their potential sociological and psychological effect on people. For 
instance, every professional team has a large number of faithful supporters 
Hence, professional sports performance might have some effect on people’s 
morale. Owing to these observations, the relationship between economic 
performance and professional sports performance is worth investigating. 
The connection mentioned above was investigated in the literature with 
different points of view. Coates and Humphreys (1999), within an economic impact 
analysis framework, reject a positive correlation between the construction of sports 
facilities and economic development. Siegfried and Zimbalist (2000) also analyze the 
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relationship between economic development and professional sports and cannot find 
the relationship between professional sports and economic development. 
Another interesting study that deals with sports economics from the side of 
public budget, Coates and Humphreys (2002), reveals that public expenditures to 
finance professional sports cannot be justified after investigating the determinants of 
real income in cities with professional sports teams. However, Coates and 
Humphreys (2002) present statistical evidence that the home city of the winning 
team in the Super Bowl has higher real per capita income, probably pointing to 
increased productivity of workers in that city. Similarly, a positive relationship 
between growth performance and the World Cup success of selected countries is 
reported in the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (2002) such that countries which 
are successful in the World Cup have higher growth performance relative to prior 
periods. 
This paper investigates the effect of soccer success on economic performance 
from a different angle – happiness. Every soccer team has a huge number of 
supporters. If these supporters are affected by the success of their team, then their 
well being will be affected. If this is the case, first their behavior then the economic 
outcomes will be affected (see Isen, 2000; and Frey and Stutzer, 2002, for a review 
of the literature). For example, Spector (1997) and Warr (1999) argue that employees 
who are satisfied with their lives are more cooperative and helpful to their 
colleagues, tend to be more punctual, report fewer sick days, and remain employed 
for longer periods than dissatisfied employees. All these are factors that increase the 
productivity of workers. If this is realized for a large number of people, then it is 
likely to affect total productivity. By considering a sample of OECD countries, 
Kenny (1999) provides some empirical evidence that happiness increases income. 
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We investigate the relationship between Turkish industrial production 
performance and success of a popular Turkish soccer team, namely Beşiktaş. At first 
sight, our focus on the success of a popular soccer team (instead of any other 
explanatory variable) and on overall industrial performance (instead of the economic 
welfare of a specific region of the country) may not seem sophisticated enough. 
However, once we present our key observations about the soccer industry in Turkey 
as well as about Turkey’s socio-economic structure, our empirical setup proves to be 
adequately formed.3  
The first set of our observations covers the structure of the Turkish soccer 
industry, which differs from its North American counterpart. First, there is an almost 
settled structure in Turkish soccer industry, i.e. almost every city has at least one 
associated team that does not change its location over time. In that respect, Turkish 
society is not familiar with the practice of a North American local administration to 
franchise a sports team. In Turkey, all sports teams are subsidized from the budget of 
the Ministry of Youth and Sports, yet the amounts of subsidy are pathetically 
symbolic. Second, new stadiums and other related facilities are rarely built. Based on 
these two major points, it seems more meaningful to analyze the impact of 
professional sports on the overall economic performance instead of focusing on local 
economies. 
Our focus on soccer is due to a second set of observations regarding the 
meaning of soccer to Turkish society. First and probably the most important, the term 
sports possessed a narrower meaning in Turkey as far as the average perception of 
the society is considered. Sert (2000) argues that soccer has an almost perfect 
association with the more general term sports in Turkey. Second, sports news on TV 
                                                 
3 Economists might think that incorporating the psychological behaviour into decision-making brings 
non-rationality into economic modeling. However, economists start to defend this kind of behaviour 
within a rational setting (see, for example, Hermalin and Isen, 2000). 
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broadcasts is almost totally related to soccer. Especially on weekends, soccer 
programs dominate nearly all TV channels and these programs have high audience 
ratings. In Turkey soccer turns out to be the topic that receives the interest of the 
majority of people.4 The generally unstable economic performance and unstable 
political dynamics leave the morale of Turkish people to be basically directed by the 
success of the soccer team that they support. Third, in the eyes of the Turkish people, 
the term soccer has a strong connotation with the three biggest teams of the country, 
namely Beşiktaş, Fenerbahçe, and Galatasaray. Based on these observations, our 
focus on soccer instead of any other branch of sports can be justified. 
On the basis of the two sets of observations which are briefly presented 
above, we are left with a setup in which we investigate the impact of Beşiktaş’ 
success on Turkish industrial performance. Once we have set the importance of 
soccer in determining Turkish people’s psychological well-being, we hypothesize 
that success in soccer affects the economic performance positively. Actually, 
psychologists argue the existence of similar relationships. The happy-worker 
hypothesis possesses key importance in the literature of industrial psychology.5,6 The 
well-being and performance of the workers constitute the subject of the hypothesis, 
such that an increasing level of happiness7, or job satisfaction, of workers is expected 
to increase their job performance. The level of job satisfaction is determined by the 
conditions of the external environment and the work environment. Here we follow a 
route that is different from that of the industrial psychology scholars in that we use 
the success of Beşiktaş as the sole determinant of workers’ happiness since it is one 
                                                 
4 Miller (1999) can be visited for the “televisualization of sports”, i.e. the process by which sports 
teams become media entities. 
5 See for example Wright et al. (2002). 
6 One may also look at Berument and Yucel (2005) for a social psychology approach to productivity 
increases. 
7 The terms “happiness”, “morale”, “well-being” and “psychological well-being” are used 
interchangeably in the rest of the article. 
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of the top ranked soccer teams in Turkey, and has fanatical supporters with strong 
team love.  
Using transfer function analysis, we demonstrate that the success of Beşiktaş 
in games played in European cups and tournaments affects the industrial 
performance positively, but not in domestic games. The increase in industrial 
production is higher if the success is observed in displacement. Section 2 describes 
the Turkish soccer game structure. In Section 3 − empirical analysis − we present our 
data, methodological framework and basic findings. Finally, we conclude the article 
in Section 4. 
 
4.2 Turkish Soccer Game Structure 
Turkish soccer teams play matches either among themselves in Turkish 
National League and Turkish Cup or with European teams in Champions League, 
UEFA Cup and Cup Winners Cup. In the past, unlike some European teams, Turkish 
teams did not play against another Turkish team in any of the European Cups. The 
Turkish National League started in 1959. At first, 16 teams were involved in a 
season; however, this number varied between 12 and 20 as time passed. For the 
sample that we consider, 16 teams played in the Turkish National League during the 
1992-93 and 1993-94 seasons. After the 1994-95 season, this number was fixed at 
18. The Turkish National League uses league status to determine the winner. All the 
teams play with each other and the winning team receives 3 points (it was 2 points 
before, but the rule was changed starting in the 1987-88 season), ties get 1 point and 
loser teams do not get any points. At the end of the season, the team that scores the 
highest wins the championship. 
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The teams playing in the Turkish Cup are determined by the Turkish Soccer 
Federation by considering the success of the team in the Turkish Cup in the previous 
season, and the success of the teams in the Turkish National League in the previous 
season. The number of the teams that play in the Turkish Cup changes every year. 
Unlike the Turkish National League, the Turkish Cup uses an elimination procedure.  
Teams that represent Turkey in European tournaments are determined by 
games played among themselves. The first two teams in the Turkish National League 
participate in the Champions League. The winner of the Turkish Cup and the third, 
fourth and fifth teams participate in the UEFA Cup. Participants of the Cup Winners 
Cup are determined by the winners of each nation’s Cups.8 For the 1992-2002 
period, the number of teams participating in the Champions Cup in Europe was 
determined with a three-step procedure. The country points9 determine the number of 
teams that represent each country in the Champions Cup. Teams from the countries 
that have low points play in elimination games in order to enter the Champions 
League. There are 32 teams in the league and 8 groups. Each group has 4 teams. 
After the matches played with each other, the first and the second teams in each 
group qualify for the second tour. There are 16 teams in the second tour. These teams 
are divided into 4 groups and 4 teams exist in each group. After the matches played 
within the groups, the first and the second teams qualify for the quarter finals. The 
league status disappears with the starting of the quarterfinals and the elimination 
procedure is used. After two-match eliminations in quarter and semi final matches, 
the final will be played in a single match and the winner will be determined. 
The status of the UEFA Cup is based on an elimination process. Country 
point status is also important in the UEFA Cup for determining the number of 
                                                 
8 After the 1998-99 season the Cup Winners Cup and the UEFA Cup were merged. 
9 Country points are determined by UEFA and FIFA by considering the success of the national and 
individual teams of each country in Europe. 
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participants with respect to the countries. Every round has a two-match elimination 
procedure. After the quarter and semifinals, the final is played in a single game in a 
country determined by the UEFA before the beginning of the cup. Before the 
merging of the UEFA Cup and the Cup Winners Cup, the teams playing in the Cup 
Winners Cup were determined by the winners of each nation’s Cups. The Cup 
Winners Cup, like the UEFA Cup, is based on an elimination process and after the 
quarter and semi finals, the final is played in a single game within a country 
determined by the UEFA before the cup. 
 
4.3. EMPRICAL ANALYSIS 
4.3.1 Modeling Approach and Variable Definitions   
We measure the industrial performance by gy, which is the logarithmic first 
difference of the seasonally adjusted industrial production index. Following Ergun 
(2000), we assume that it follows an autoregressive process. Later, it is regressed 
against its lags10 up to the fifth order and variables that measure the success of 
Beşiktaş. The inclusion of lags of the monthly rate of change of industrial production 
allows us to handle the trend behavior of the original industrial production series. 
The part of variation not explained by the autoregressive model for gy  is attributed to 
Beşiktaş by using the variables Zjt as shown in Equation 4: 
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In terms of Equation 4, the values of αk, k = 0, .., 5, and γj are the parameters 
                                                 
10 The optimal lag length used in the analysis is determined using the Final Prediction Error criterion. 
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to be estimated. Zjt denotes the jth measure for the success of Beşiktaş at time t. The εt 
is the i.i.d. error term. In order to obtain a meaningful time-series for the Zjt, we first 
classify the games played in each month on the basis of the host team’s field. If the 
game is played at Beşiktaş’ home field, then it is put in the category of home and 
when it is played at the rival’s field it is classified as displacement. Second, the score 
of each game is translated into a win, tie, or loss from the Beşiktaş’ point of view. 
We define our temporal rule as recording a game that is actually played in month t 
for month t + 1 if the first consequent workday belongs to month t + 1. We denote 
the number of games won, tied and lost with W, T, and L respectively. Subscript h 
refers to games played at Beşiktaş home and d stands for the games played in 
displacement. The absence of a subscript indicates that we consolidate the data 
regardless of the field information. Superscript All indicates all the games, Turkey is 
used for the games played in the domestic tournaments, Europe is for the games 
played in European tournaments, and Season is for the games played in the national-
season. 
The coefficients γj are of interest in Equation 411. The variable  is assumed 
to follow an autoregressive process that is interrupted by Z
y
tg
jt in each period. The 
coefficient γj of the variable Zjt is tested under the null hypothesis (H0 : γj = 0). This 
type of specification is often used in the literature12. (One may look at Enders, 1995, 
for the transfer function analysis). In the recent literature, Ergun (2000) also used the 
transfer function analysis to investigate various Turkish macroeconomic variable 
aggregates. In our case, we study the effects of Beşiktaş’ success on Turkish 
                                                 
11 Using mathematical terminology, these coefficients correspond to the transfer function that we 
estimate. The “transfer function” is the statistically estimated relationship that explains how an 
exogenous movement is transferred to an autoregressive endogenous variable. 
12 For instance, McCallum (1978), Alesina and Sachs (1988), Ito and Park (1988), and Heckelman and 
Berument (1998) employ similar transfer function specifications in their analyses of political business 
cycles. 
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industrial performance. Since we do not expect a feedback from industrial 
performance to performance of Beşiktaş as also supported by our preliminary 
analysis, the problem of endogeneity is not relevant. 
The possible sensitivity of our results to our choice of including only Beşiktaş 
may be an important point. For instance, the success of Beşiktaş in the national 
soccer season, reminiscent of a zero-sum game, means the failure of another team in 
a given week of the national season fixture. Thus, one may expect that the 
productivity augmenting effects of different soccer teams offset each other. This is 
especially apparent when we consider the competition among the top-ranked teams 
for the championship. Even if these top-ranked teams do not play against each other 
in every given week, the success of one indicates increasing difficulty in the 
competition for the other ones.13 On the other hand, the success of Beşiktaş in games 
played abroad may induce higher productivity for the corresponding month; since 
Turkish people have a tendency to entangle foreign games with national pride and 
identification. 
Lastly, the financial crisis occurring in 1994 affected the Turkish economy 
adversely. Thus, it is necessary to include the 1994 crisis in empirical studies. 
Consecutively, the 3rd, 4th, 5th and 6th months of 1994 are controlled by using a 
dummy variable for each: D94-3, D94-4, D94-5, and D94-6 respectively. Similarly, for the 
financial crises of 2000 and 2001, we define the dummy variables for November 
2000 and February 2001, namely D00-11 and D01-02. 
                                                 
13 In a given week, each team plays with its rival according to the season fixture. If it wins, it gets 3 
points, ties are assigned 1 point and losses receive no points at all. At the end, the champion is the 
team with the highest cumulative points. 
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 4.3.2. Data 
Data on industrial production, which is the proxy of income in our study, is 
obtained from the data delivery system of the Central Bank of Turkey.14 Historical 
game records of Beşiktaş are compiled from Tanrikulu (2002) and from the official 
website of the UEFA15. The study period is from 1992:08 to 2002:10. Recalling the 
definition of economic performance, individual income could be proxied in a more 
direct fashion using consumption data. However, neither a measure of this variable 
nor a proxy of it is available for Turkey at monthly frequencies. Hence, we cannot 
work on it. 
Beginning in 1992, Turkish soccer teams began to improve their success rate 
in Europe. Galatasaray’s achievements in the UEFA Champions League, which is a 
tournament where all the champions of the countries of Europe are gathered, 
positively motivated other Turkish soccer teams in European tournaments. Thus, we 
take that year as the beginning of our sample. 
 
4.3.3. Model estimates  
We present our model estimates in two different samples. In the first series of 
regressions, we want to see the relationship between industrial production (growth) 
                                                 
14 Electronic Data Delivery System of the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey is an appropriate 
medium for extracting economic data related to Turkey which is released by official data providers. 
The delivery system can be reached at http://tcmbf40.tcmb.gov.tr/cbt.html. The primary source of 
industrial production is The State Institute of Statistics. 
15 UEFA data are accessible at http://www.uefa.com. 
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and the success of Beşiktaş for the period of 1992:08-2002:10. The second one uses 
the data between the two financial crises that Turkey experienced: 1995:01-
2000:10.16 We present our estimates in the first series of regressions in Table 7 and 
Table 8. The specifications of Table 7 hide the home/displacement field information 
but classify the games as win, lose or tie. In the specifications presented in Table 8, 
we distinguish between the home/displacement field of the games so as to find out 
whether the home-field is an important factor in translating the success of the team 
into workers’ morale. Crisis dummies to control the months of Turkey’s financial 
crises and the lags of gy are common to both tables, as well as the sum of squared 
residuals, and . A quick glance at the tables shows the negative impact of the 
April 1994 financial crisis. In all six specifications, the effect of the dummy variables 
is significantly negative17. Increased liquidity on November 2000, which is 
represented by, D00-11 is positive in all six specifications. The February 2001 crisis 
has the same impact as the April 1994 crisis as suggested by Table 7 and Table 8, 
since all the coefficients associated with D01-02 are negative. 
2R 2R
Specification 1.1 in Table 7 is the summary of all games played by Beşiktaş. 
Winnings seem to increase industrial production but the coefficients are not 
statistically significant. The statistical evidence suggests that ties and losses do not 
affect industrial production. Specification 1.2 contains the games played in Turkey 
and winnings increase industrial production growth. However, the evidence is not 
statistically significant. Ties and losses seem to have a negative impact on industrial 
production, but the relationship between industrial production and ties and losses in 
Turkey is not statistically significant.  
Specification 1.3 is highly remarkable. The winnings of Beşiktaş in Europe 
                                                 
16 Berument and Kilinc (2003) argue that the dynamics of the industrial production between the 
financial crises is different from the full sample. 
17 The level of significance is 5% unless otherwise noted. 
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increase industrial production by nearly 0.15%, and the estimated coefficient is a 
statistically significant finding. Ties have a negative impact on industrial production 
but this evidence is not statistically significant. The relationship between industrial 
production and losses in Europe is not statistically significant either. 
In the specifications presented in Table 8, we distinguish between games 
played at home and in displacement. In Specification 2.1, we do not have statistically 
significant evidence that either winnings, ties or losses at home or in displacement 
have an explanatory power for the industrial growth.  
Specification 2.2 decomposes the games into opposing teams: if the opponent 
is another Turkish team, there is no statistically significant evidence that the score 
and the location of the game have an explanatory power for industrial production. On 
the other hand, the estimates of Specification 2.3 suggest a statistically significant 
relationship between industrial production and the games Beşiktaş played in Europe. 
Regardless of the home-field of the game, the winnings of Beşiktaş are associated 
with the increased industrial production growth rate. This increase is slightly higher 
if the game is played in displacement, where both of the estimates are statistically 
significant. The increase in the monthly growth rate of industrial production due to 
the winnings of Beşiktaş at home is around 0.14%, and in displacement is around 
0.39%. This higher effect further suggests that winning in displacement increases 
industrial production more than winning at home. Beşiktaş ties, whether at home or 
in displacement decrease industrial production, but this evidence is not statistically 
significant. Neither losses at home nor losses in displacement change the industrial 
production in a statistically significant manner.  
It is worth mentioning that this time span includes the most devastating 
financial crises of Turkish economy, namely the ones of 1994 and 2001. Thus, one 
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can always question the reliability of our empirical findings. In order to handle such 
criticisms, e.g. checking for the robustness of our estimates in the first series of 
regressions, we run a second series of regressions in which we trim our data for the 
1994 and 2001 crises. Table 9 and Table 10 report the estimates for the sample 
between January 1995 and October 2000. In Table 9, again we do not have any 
statistically significant correlations between the dependent variable and independent 
variables in Specifications 3.1 and 3.2. In Specification 3.3, winnings in Europe 
increase industrial production by 0.15%, which is also statistically significant. Ties 
and losses in Europe do not affect the industrial production index significantly.  
In Table 10 we cannot find any statistically significant relationships between 
dependent and independent variables in Specification 4.1 and 4.2. Nevertheless, there 
are some important results in Specification 4.3, which involves the games played in 
Europe. Winnings at home increase industrial production index by 0.13%, which is a 
statistically significant finding. Winnings in displacement in Europe slightly increase 
the production by 0.52% in a statistically significant manner. Winnings in 
displacement increase the industrial production more than winnings at home. Neither 
ties nor losses affect production in a statistically significant manner. 
 
4.4 Conclusion 
In this study, we try to assess any relationship between economic 
performance and the success of a popular Turkish team: Beşiktaş. The success of a 
soccer team may motivate workers to be more productive and this may boost the 
economic performance. Thus, we study how workers’ happiness affects industrial 
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performance and present statistically significant evidence that there is a positive 
feedback from workers’ happiness to industrial performance using a transfer function 
analysis. The magnitude of this positive feedback is an increase in the monthly rate 
of industrial growth for the games won by Beşiktaş in European cups. Moreover, this 
increase is higher if these wins occur in displacement (the home of the rival team). 
However, we are not able to find this positive feedback in Turkish National 
League games in a statistically significant manner. There is a canceling effect for the 
supporters of rival clubs of Beşiktaş, which may offset the positive effects of 
Beşiktaş in the national season. 
The increase in labor productivity due to the effect of a popular Turkish team 
such as Beşiktaş, by supporting the happy worker hypothesis, makes us agree with 
Coates and Humphreys (2002).  
There is room for further research using consumption data or some other 
determinants of industrial production. Finally, the investigation on the net 
macroeconomic effect due to Beşiktaş within a different economic framework is left 
for a future study. 
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Table 1: Tests of Number Of Factors That Influence The Change in The EMBI 
Spread 
 
  Venezuela,Mexico,Panama,Poland,Russia,Turkey,S.Africa Brazil, Bulgary, Egypt, Nigeria,Peru 
H0:Num. of Factors Wald Stat. Deg. of Freedom p-value Num. of Obs. Wald Stat. Deg. of Freedom p-value Num. of Obs. 
0 59.58 21 0.00001 54 18.39 10 0.04871 54 
1 23.72 14 0.04949 54 2.30 5  0.80548 54 
2 6.14 8 0.63050 54 0.3134 1  0.57563 54 
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TABLE 2: Both Actual and Surprise Change is Positive 
 
  Event Dates and Federal Funds Rate Changes EMBI 
        Expected Unexpected 
  Dates Actual Change Surprise Change 5 days 10 days 5 days 10 days 
Event 1 24.08.1999 0,25 0,02 Egypt Egypt Brazil Brazil 
        Panama Panama* Nigeria Nigeria 
        Poland Poland Peru Peru 
        S.Africa S.Africa Russia* Russia 
        Mexico   Turkey* Turkey* 
        Bulgaria*     Mexico* 
        Venezuela*     Bulgaria* 
            Venezuela 
                
Event 2 16.11.1999 0,25 0,09 Brazil Brazil Venezuela Venezuela 
        Egypt Egypt Nigeria Nigeria 
        Bulgaria   Panama Panama 
        Mexico*   Peru* Peru 
        Poland   Russia Russia 
            Turkey Turkey 
            S.Africa S.Africa 
              Poland 
              Bulgaria* 
              Mexico 
                
Event 3 16.05.2000 0,50 0,05 Brazil Brazil Egypt Egypt 
        Bulgaria* Bulgaria Mexico*   
        Venezuela Venezuela Nigeria*   
        Panama* Panama S.Africa   
        Peru Peru     
        Poland Poland     
        Russia Russia     
        Turkey Turkey     
          Mexico     
          Nigeria     
          S.Africa     
Note: * means the change is not significant at 5% level 
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TABLE 3: Actual Change Is Positive Surprise Change Is Negative 
 
  Event Dates and Federal Funds Rate Changes EMBI 
        Expected Unexpected 
  Dates Actual Change Surprise Change 5 days 10 days 5 days 10 days 
Event 1 30.06.1999 0,25 -0,04 Venezuela Venezuela Brazil Brazil 
        Mexico Mexico Nigeria* Nigeria 
        Poland Poland Panama* Panama 
        Turkey Turkey Russia Russia 
        Egypt   S.Africa S.Africa 
        Peru     Egypt* 
        Bulgaria     Peru 
              Bulgaria 
                
Event 2 02.02.2000 0,25 -0,05 Brazil Brazil Egypt* Egypt 
        Bulgaria* Bulgaria* Panama Panama 
        Venezuela* Venezuela Russia Russia 
        Nigeria Nigeria Mexico* S.Africa 
        Peru Peru     
        Poland* Poland*     
        Turkey Turkey     
        S.Africa Mexico*     
                
Event 3 21.03.2000 0,25 -0,03 Panama Panama* Egypt Egypt 
        Turkey Turkey Mexico Mexico 
        Bulgaria   Nigeria Nigeria 
        S.Africa   Peru Peru 
        Brazil   Poland Poland 
            Russia* Russia 
            Venezuela Venezuela 
              Brazil* 
              Bulgaria* 
              S.Africa* 
                
Event 4 30.06.2004 0,25 -1,00 Bulgaria Bulgaria Egypt Egypt* 
        Venezuela Venezuela Mexico* Mexico* 
        Nigeria Nigeria Peru Peru* 
          Brazil* Poland Poland 
          Panama* Turkey Turkey 
          Russia South Africa South Africa 
            Brazil   
            Panama*   
            Russia*   
Note: * means the change is not significant at 5% level 
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TABLE 4: Both Actual Change And Surprise Change Is Negative 
 
  Event Dates and Federal Funds Rate Changes EMBI 
        Expected Unexpected 
  Dates Actual Change Surprise Change 5 days 10 days 5 days 10 days 
Event 1 15.10.1998 -0,25 -0,26 Brazil Brazil     
        Bulgaria Bulgaria     
        Venezuela Venezuela     
        Egypt Egypt     
        Mexico Mexico     
        Nigeria Nigeria     
        Panama Panama     
        Peru Peru     
        Poland Poland     
        Russia Russia     
        Turkey Turkey     
        S.Africa S.Africa     
                
Event 2 17.11.1998 -0,25 -0,06 Brazil Brazil   Egypt 
        Bulgaria Bulgaria     
        Venezuela Venezuela     
        Mexico Mexico     
        Nigeria Nigeria*     
        Panama Panama     
        Peru Peru     
        Poland Poland     
        Russia Russia*     
        Turkey Turkey     
        S.Africa S.Africa     
        Egypt       
                
Event 3 03.01.2001 -0,50 -0,38 Brazil Brazil Nigeria*   
        Bulgaria Bulgaria     
        Venezuela Venezuela     
        Egypt Egypt     
        Mexico Mexico     
        Panama Panama     
        Peru Peru     
        Poland Poland     
        Russia Russia     
        Turkey Turkey     
        S.Africa S.Africa     
          Nigeria*     
Note: * means the change is not significant at 5% level 
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TABLE 4: Both Actual Change And Surprise Change Is Negative(cont’d) 
 
  Event Dates and Federal Funds Rate Changes EMBI 
        Expected Unexpected 
  Dates Actual Change Surprise Change 5 days 10 days 5 days 10 days 
Event 4 18.04.2001 -0,50 -0,43 Panama Panama Brazil Brazil 
        Russia Russia Bulgaria Bulgaria 
          Egypt* Venezuela Venezuela 
          Nigeria* Mexico Mexico 
          Peru Poland Poland 
          Turkey* S.Africa S.Africa 
            Egypt   
            Nigeria   
            Peru*   
            Turkey   
                
Event 5 15.05.2001 -0,50 -0,08 Brazil Brazil   Bulgaria 
        Venezuela Venezuela     
        Egypt Egypt     
        Mexico Mexico     
        Nigeria Nigeria     
        Panama Panama     
        Peru Peru     
        Poland Poland     
        Russia Russia     
        Turkey Turkey     
        S.Africa S.Africa     
        Bulgaria       
                
Event 6 17.09.2001 -0,50 -0,32 Panama*   Brazil Brazil 
            Bulgaria Bulgaria 
            Venezuela Venezuela 
            Egypt Egypt 
            Mexico Mexico 
            Nigeria Nigeria 
            Peru Peru 
            Poland Poland 
            Russia Russia 
            Turkey Turkey 
            S.Africa S.Africa 
              Panama 
Note: * means the change is not significant at 5% level 
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TABLE 4: Both Actual Change And Surprise Change Is Negative(cont’d) 
 
 Event Dates and Federal Funds Rate Changes EMBI 
        Expected Unexpected 
  Dates Actual Change Surprise Change 5 days 10 days 5 days 10 days 
Event 7 02.10.2001 -0,50 -0,07 Nigeria* Nigeria* Brazil Brazil 
        Russia* Russia* Bulgaria Bulgaria 
          Panama* Venezuela Venezuela* 
            Egypt Egypt 
            Mexico Mexico 
            Peru Peru 
            Poland Poland 
            Turkey* Turkey* 
            S.Africa S.Africa 
            Panama*   
                
Event 8 06.11.2001 -0,50 -0,10 Bulgaria Bulgaria Brazil Brazil 
        Venezuela Venezuela Mexico* Mexico 
        Nigeria Nigeria   Egypt 
        Panama Panama     
        Peru Peru     
        Poland Poland     
        Russia Russia     
        Turkey Turkey     
        S.Africa S.Africa     
        Egypt*       
                
Event 9 06.11.2002 -0,50 -0,19 Venezuela* Venezuela Brazil Brazil* 
        Mexico Mexico Panama Panama* 
        Poland Poland Bulgaria   
        Russia* Russia Egypt*   
        Turkey* Turkey Nigeria*   
          Bulgaria Peru*   
          Egypt* S.Africa   
          Nigeria*     
          Peru     
          S.Africa     
Note: * means the change is not significant at 5% level 
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TABLE 5: Actual Change Is Negative And Surprise Change Is Positive 
 
  Event Dates and Federal Funds Rate Changes EMBI 
        Expected Unexpected 
  Dates Actual Change Surprise Change 5 days 10 days 5 days 10 days 
Event 1 31.01.2001 -0,50 0,01 Nigeria Nigeria Brazil* Brazil 
        Panama Panama Egypt* Egypt 
        Poland* Venezuela* Mexico* Mexico* 
        Bulgaria   Turkey* Turkey 
            Peru Peru 
            Russia* Russia* 
            S.Africa* S.Africa 
            Venezuela* Bulgaria 
              Nigeria 
                
Event 2 20.03.2001 -0,50 0,06 Brazil Brazil Russia Russia 
        Bulgaria Bulgaria   Peru* 
        Venezuela* Venezuela     
        Egypt Egypt     
        Mexico* Mexico     
        Nigeria Nigeria     
        Panama Panama*     
        Poland* Poland     
        Turkey Turkey     
        Peru* S.Africa     
        S.Africa*       
                
Event 3 27.06.2001 -0,25 0,05 Brazil Brazil Mexico Mexico* 
        Bulgaria* Bulgaria Peru Peru* 
        Venezuela Venezuela Poland Poland 
        Egypt Egypt Russia Russia 
        Turkey* Turkey* Nigeria   
          Nigeria* Panama   
          Panama* S.Africa   
          S.Africa*     
Note: * means the change is not significant at 5% level 
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TABLE 5: Actual Change Is Negative And Surprise Change Is Positive(cont’d) 
 
  Event Dates and Federal Funds Rate Changes EMBI 
        Expected Unexpected 
  Dates Actual Change Surprise Change 5 days 10 days 5 days 10 days 
Event 4 21.08.2001 -0,25 0,02 Mexico Mexico Brazil Brazil 
        Panama Panama Venezuela Venezuela 
        Russia Russia Peru Peru* 
          Bulgaria* Poland Poland 
          Egypt* Turkey Turkey 
          Nigeria* S.Africa S.Africa 
            Bulgaria   
            Egypt*   
            Nigeria*   
                
Event 5 25.06.2003 -0,25 0,15 Brazil Brazil Mexico* Mexico* 
        Bulgaria Bulgaria Peru Peru 
        Venezuela Venezuela Russia* Russia 
        Egypt* Egypt   Panama* 
        Nigeria* Nigeria     
        Poland Poland     
        Turkey* Turkey     
        S.Africa S.Africa     
        Panama*       
Note: * means the change is not significant at 5% level 
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TABLE 6: No Surprise 
 
  Event Dates and Federal Funds Rate Changes EMBI 
        Expected Unexpected 
  Dates Actual Change Surprise Change 5 days 10 days 5 days 10 days 
Event 1 11.12.2001 -0,25 0,00 Bulgaria Bulgaria Brazil* Brazil 
        Venezuela Venezuela Egypt Egypt 
        Mexico Mexico Peru   
        Nigeria Nigeria     
        Panama Panama     
        Poland Poland     
        Russia Russia     
        Turkey Turkey     
        S.Africa S.Africa     
          Peru*     
Note: * means the change is not significant at 5% level 
 
 
TABLE 7.  Estimated models: 1992:08-2002:10 a 
 
 SPECIFICATIONS 
 1.1 1.2 1.3 
Constant 0.355 (3.586) 0.380 (3.509) 0.399 (4.431) 
D94–3 –0.751 (–5.997) –0.733 (–5.638) –0.648 (–7.548) 
D94–4 –0.587 (–5.076) –0.523 (–4.120) –0.587 (–5.703) 
D94–5 –1.326 (–9.675) –1.253 (–8.561) –1.285 (–10.725) 
D94–6 –0.681 (–4.122) –0.723 (–4.078) –0.712 (–4.424) 
D00–11 0.180 (1.988) 0.215 (2.158) 0.243 (3.817) 
D01–02 –0.046 (–0.359) 0.050 (0.367) 0.001 (0.012) 
W 0.023 (0.918)   
T –0.039 (–0.752)   
L 0.018 (0.479)   
WTurkey  0.008 (0.317)  
TTurkey   –0.021 (–0.380)  
LTurkey   –0.032 (–0.628)  
WEurope   0.155 (2.835) 
TEurope   –0.072 (–0.693) 
LEurope    0.044 (0.689) 
yg 1−  0.249 (2.583) 0.253 (2.520) 0.237 (2.338) 
yg 2−  0.405 (4.782) 0.406 (4.785) 0.377 (4.451) 
yg 3−  0.028 (0.290) 0.024 (0.251) 0.041 (0.422) 
yg 4−  –0.139 (–1.454) –0.140 (–1.456) –0.133 (–1.409) 
yg 5−  0.147 (1.862) 0.158 (2.008) 0.133 (1.770) 
SSR 14.817 14.950 14.627 
R2 0.498 0.494 0.505 
2R  0.433 0.428 0.441 
a We cover the whole data span but control for the crises by using dummies. We do not distinguish between the games played at 
home versus those in displacement. t-statistics are reported in parentheses near to the corresponding estimated parameters. 
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TABLE 8. Estimated models: 1992:08-2002:10 a 
 
 SPECIFICATIONS 
 2.1 2.2 2.3 
Constant 0.368 (3.603) 0.368 (3.348) 0.413 (4.498) 
D94–3 –0.755 (–5.910) –0.739 (–5.372) –0.644 (–7.436) 
D94–4 –0.610 (–4.022) –0.494 (–2.318) –0.589 (–5.553) 
D94–5 –1.320 (–9.288) –1.255 (–8.347) –1.289 (–10.594) 
D94–6 –0.686 (–4.073) –0.716 (–3.979) –0.722 (–4.429) 
D00–11 0.134 (1.346) 0.204 (1.855) 0.230 (3.112) 
D01–02 –0.032 (–0.224) 0.054 (0.368) –0.002 (–0.025) 
Wh  0.020 (0.491)  
Wd 0.031 (0.617)  
Th  –0.094 (–1.337)  
Td  –0.010 (–0.169)  
Lh  –0.028 (–0.488)  
Ld 0.061 (1.185)  
WhTurkey   0.011 (0.270)  
WdTurkey  0.021 (0.407)  
ThTurkey   –0.081 (–0.968)  
TdTurkey  0.023 (0.361)  
LhTurkey   –0.049 (–0.728)  
LdTurkey   –0.010 (–0.111)  
WhEurope    0.140 (1.956) 
WdEurope   0.396 (3.487) 
ThEurope    –0.038 (–0.395) 
TdEurope   –0.185 (–0.908) 
LhEurope    –0.018 (–0.125) 
LdEurope    0.061 (0.845) 
yg 1−  0.251 (2.643) 0.258 (2.628) 0.229 (2.227) 
yg 2−  0.409 (4.960) 0.407 (4.885) 0.378 (4.403) 
yg 3−  0.018 (0.196) 0.009 (0.103) 0.038 (0.381) 
yg 4−  –0.146 (–1.491) –0.134 (–1.334) –0.130 (–1.342) 
yg 5−  0.151 (1.917) 0.164 (2.075) 0.128 (1.706) 
SSR 14.563 14.801 14.463 
R2 0.507 0.499 0.510 
2R  0.427 0.418 0.431 
a We cover the whole data span but control for the crises by using dummies. We also account for where the game is played. t–
statistics are reported in parentheses near to the corresponding estimated parameters. 
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TABLE 9. Estimated models: 1995:01–2000:10 a 
 
 SPECIFICATIONS 
 3.1 3.2 3.3 
Constant 0.315 (1.695) 0.321 (1.637) 0.406 (2.535) 
W 0.022 (0.809)  
T –0.063 (–1.089)  
L –0.030 (–0.649)  
WTurkey 0.006 (0.218)  
TTurkey  –0.064 (–0.935)  
LTurkey  –0.110 (–1.530)  
WEurope  0.150 (2.218) 
TEurope  –0.111 (–0.974) 
LEurope   0.026 (0.372) 
yg 1−  0.166 (1.382) 0.132 (1.014) 0.135 (1.037) 
yg 2−  0.470 (4.419) 0.469 (4.438) 0.441 (3.866) 
yg 3−  –0.073 (–0.657) –0.059 (–0.554) –0.053 (–0.482) 
yg 4−  –0.070 (–0.559) –0.057 (–0.451) –0.100 (–0.845) 
yg 5−  0.285 (2.404) 0.334 (2.565) 0.250 (2.360) 
SSR 7.783 7.645 7.721 
R2 0.366 0.378 0.371 
2R  0.283 0.296 0.289 
a We estimate our model for the years between two major crises in the Turkish economy. We do not distinguish between the 
games played at home versus those in displacement. t–statistics are reported in parentheses near to the corresponding estimated 
parameters. 
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TABLE 10. Estimated models: 1995:01–2000:10 a 
 
 SPECIFICATIONS 
 4.1 4.2 4.3 
Constant 0.348 (1.826) 0.299 (1.524) 0.447 (2.805) 
Wh  0.012 (0.252)   
Wd 0.045 (0.715)   
Th  –0.166 (–2.109)   
Td  –0.016 (–0.240)   
Lh  –0.080 (–1.032)   
Ld 0.020 (0.381)   
WhTurkey   0.005 (0.108)  
WdTurkey  0.036 (0.553)  
ThTurkey   –0.183 (–1.817)  
TdTurkey  0.010 (0.152)  
LhTurkey   –0.099 (–1.252)  
LdTurkey   –0.129 (–1.108)  
WhEurope    0.128 (1.670) 
WdEurope   0.517 (4.189) 
ThEurope    –0.109 (–1.086) 
TdEurope   –0.305 (–1.459) 
LhEurope    0.096 (0.550) 
LdEurope    0.022 (0.278) 
yg 1−  0.164 (1.418) 0.143 (1.195) 0.113 (0.837) 
yg 2−  0.472 (4.262) 0.462 (4.042) 0.439 (3.804) 
yg 3−  –0.105 (–1.004) –0.098 (–0.955) –0.049 (–0.430) 
yg 4−  –0.077 (–0.567) –0.029 (–0.214) –0.091 (–0.768) 
yg 5−  0.308 (2.582) 0.356 (2.720) 0.228 (2.194) 
SSR 7.441 7.352 7.428 
R2 0.394 0.402 0.395 
2R  0.280 0.288 0.281 
a We estimate our model for the years between two major crises in the Turkish economy. We also account for where the game is 
played. t-statistics are reported in parentheses near to the corresponding estimated parameters. 
 
 51
 
Figure 1: Actual And Surprise Component Changes In 2004 
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Figure 2: Response of the ISE100 to the S&P500 for the full sample 
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Figure 3: Response of the ISE100 to the S&P500 from 23.10.1987 to 01.12.1993 
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Figure 4: Response of the ISE100 to the S&P500 from 01.06.1994 to  01.12.1999            
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Figure 5: Response of the ISE100 to the S&P500 from 01.01.2000 to 01.11.2000 
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Figure 6: Response of the ISE100 to the S&P500 from 13.03.2001 to 10.09.2001 
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Figure 7: Response of the ISE100 to the S&P500 from 01.01.2002 to 28.02.2003 
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Figure 8: Response of the ISE100 to the S&P500 from 01.05.2003 to 08.06.2004 
 
0 5 10 15
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 55
